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Economic Impacts of Food Fraud 
When you order seafood at a restaurant, do you 
get what you pay for? Scientists from Oceana, a 
non-profit marine conservation organization, 
conducted one of the largest seafood fraud investi-
gations on 1,215 samples from 674 outlets in 21 
states of the United States (U.S.) over the period 
2010 to 2012.They found that there is, on average, 
a 33% probability that you do not actually get 
what you pay for. The share of mislabeled food 
was (a quite remarkable) 74% for seafood sold in 
sushi restaurants and 18% of seafood sold in gro-
cery stores with mislabeled “red snapper” and 
“tuna” accounting for 90% and 55% of the rele-
vant tested products, respectively.  
Food fraud became particularly prevalent in the 
middle ages when many merchants mixed cheap 
substitutes with expensive imported spices and 
sold them throughout Europe. During the 18th and 
19th centuries, food fraud became widespread in 
the U.S. The most common types of food fraud 
include milk being watered down and mixed with 
chalk, lead being added to coffee, and cheap sub-
stitutes mixed into spices. Despite technological 
advancements that enable the detection of food 
fraud and consumers ranking authenticity and 
safety of food top among non-economic issues, 
food fraud still occurs with approximately 10% of 
the food on the grocery shelves in the U.S. being 
adulterated or mislabeled. 
Food fraud is also quite prevalent in Europe. In 
one of the largest food fraud investigations 
launched by Interpol and Europol in 47 countries 
during the period December 2014 to January 
2015, there were thousands of tons of adulterated  
Market Report  Year 
Ago  4 Wks Ago  4-24-20 
Livestock and Products, 
Weekly Average          
Nebraska Slaughter Steers, 
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .  *  *  * 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .  183.34  166.36  160.88 
Nebraska Feeder Steers, 
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .  155.53  139.67  128.00 
Choice Boxed Beef, 
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  233.49  255.07  272.33 
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price 
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  80.53  *  * 
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass 
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  84.19  75.76  75.28 
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn, 
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .  152.78  162.63  162.25 
National Carcass Lamb Cutout 
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  386.15  433.70  408.60 
Crops, 
Daily Spot Prices          
Wheat, No. 1, H.W. 
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.65  4.44  4.28 
Corn, No. 2, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.44  3.04  2.76 
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow 
Columbus, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .  7.52  8.19  7.66 
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow 
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  5.30  5.38  5.64 
Oats, No. 2, Heavy 
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3.25  2.96  3.02 
Feed          
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales, 
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185 
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .  *  *  * 
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good 
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  115.00  90.00  90.00 
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good 
 Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .  87.50  85.00  85.00 
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  123.50  198.00  193.33 
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture 
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  45.00  54.37  56.65 
 ⃰ No Market          
Food seized, including 31 tons of chemically treated 
seafood from Italy and 35 tons of counterfeit butter 
from Egypt.  
Food fraud in the form of food adulteration and misla-
beling is viewed as a threat to the integrity of the in-
creasingly industrialized agri-food system and is a ma-
jor concern for consumers, the food industry, and gov-
ernments around the world. The 2008 Chinese milk 
scandal demonstrated the consequences of food adul-
teration on a global scale affecting consumers and in-
dustries in multiple countries. The scandal involved 
selling watered-down milk as high-quality milk, and 
adding melamine in milk to boost its protein content 
and pass nutritional tests. Due to this scandal, 290,000 
babies around the world were affected by melamine 
contamination out of which 6 died and 52,000 were 
hospitalized.  
Food fraud is motivated by economic gains and is ena-
bled by the fact that many of the food attributes con-
sumers care about are credence attributes, that is, their 
true nature is not detectable by consumers through 
search or experience. Thus, while producers know 
whether a product is high-quality or not, consumers do 
not. While the introduction of certification and label-
ing can solve this information problem and ensure the 
presence of the high-quality products in the market, it 
can also create incentives for fraudulent behavior by 
producers in the form of food adulteration and misla-
beling. Such fraudulent behavior is normally enabled 
by the prevalence of imperfect monitoring and en-
forcement systems. 
Despite the prevalence of food fraud and its sometimes 
devastating consequences for consumer well-being and 
the sectors involved, a systematic economic analysis of 
food fraud is virtually absent. Previous research on 
food fraud has focused mainly on product mislabeling 
and its impact on consumers. 
A study based on the Ph.D. dissertation of Dr. 
Imran Meerza in the Department of Agricultural Eco-
nomics at the University of Nebraska was published 
recently and analyzes the impacts of food fraud in the 
form of both food adulteration and mislabeling on all 
interest groups involved, i.e., consumers, producers, 
and middlemen (e.g., food processors and retailers). 
Specifically, the aforementioned study analyzes the sys-
tem-wide market and welfare effects of food fraud, i.e., 
the effects of food adulteration and mislabeling on the 
equilibrium prices and quantities in the relevant food  
product markets and the welfare of consumers, 
producers and middlemen in the relevant supply 
channels. 
To analyze the system-wide economic impacts of 
food fraud, the study developed an empirically rel-
evant theoretical framework of food markets with 
heterogeneous consumers and producers (i.e., 
consumers differing in their preferences and agri-
cultural producers differing in their efficiency/
costs of production), and imperfectly competitive 
middlemen. The explicit consideration of consum-
er and producer heterogeneity allows the consider-
ation of asymmetries in the probability of fraud 
detection for low- and high-quality producers; en-
ables the disaggregation of the welfare effects of 
food fraud (i.e., the determination of the effects of 
food fraud on different consumers and producers 
of the products of interest); and reveals the diverse 
incentives faced by different producer groups en-
gaged in and affected by fraudulent behavior.   
Analytical results show that the price of the high 
(low) quality product decreases (increases) in the 
presence of food fraud, while the effects of food 
fraud on equilibrium quantities are case-specific 
and dependent on the relative magnitude of the 
demand and supply effects of food adulteration 
and mislabeling. Moreover, the magnitude of the 
price effects of food fraud depends on the type of 
food fraud with the equilibrium price of the high 
(low) quality food falling (increasing) more under 
food adulteration than under mislabeling. In most 
cases, the profits of the high-quality product sup-
pliers fall while the profits of the low-quality prod-
uct suppliers increase in the presence of food 
fraud.  
The involvement of low-quality producers in 
fraudulent behavior is case-specific. In particular, 
low-quality producers will find it optimal to adul-
terate and/or mislabel their products when the net 
expected benefit of fraudulent behavior decreases 
with the efficiency of producers and the supply 
effect dominates the demand effect of food fraud. 
A key insight of this study is that producers of high-
quality products can also find it optimal to commit 
fraud. In fact, our analysis shows that at least some 
producers of high quality will always have incen-
tives to commit fraud. The subgroup of high-
quality producers that commits fraud was shown  
to depend on the social attitudes towards food fraud, 
the enforcement policy parameters, and the relative 
magnitude of the demand and supply effects of food 
fraud.  
Explicitly accounting for consumer and producer het-
erogeneity is critical in understanding the highly 
asymmetric welfare effects of food fraud across con-
sumers (with different preferences) and producers 
(with different levels of efficiency). Our results indi-
cate that, in most cases, (many) high-quality produc-
ers and all low-quality producers who adulterate or 
mislabel their product gain the most, followed by low-
quality producers who continue to produce the low-
quality product but do not commit food fraud. While 
honest low-quality producers gain, honest high-
quality producers always lose in the presence of food 
fraud. Intriguingly, even though the presence of food 
fraud has different impacts on honest producers of 
low- and high-quality products, it is shown to reduce 
the welfare of both high and low-quality product con-
sumers. 
A comparison of the consumer welfare losses under 
food adulteration and mislabeling, indicates that the 
total consumer welfare loss is higher under food adul-
teration. While the equilibrium quantity of the high-
quality product is higher in the presence of mislabel-
ing, the increased price premia enjoyed by the prod-
uct marketed as high quality under mislabeling make 
producers more likely to mislabel than adulterate 
their products. 
Having identified the market and welfare effects of 
food fraud on all interest groups involved and the 
groups which are more likely to engage in fraudulent 
behavior, the analysis can serve as the basis for the 
determination of the optimal policy response to food 
fraud, like the optimal level of monitoring and en-
forcement under different government objectives and 
weights on the interest groups involved. It can also 
provide the basis for estimating the effects of food 
fraud information on consumers’ valuation of the 
affected products and for quantifying the market and 
welfare impacts of food fraud incidents on the interest 
groups involved. Since the important market and wel-
fare effects of food fraud were shown to be case/
scenario specific, determining the values of the key 
parameters is critical for identifying the relevant sce-
nario at play and, through this, the market and wel-
fare impacts of fraudulent activity. Interesting exten- 
sions of this research also include the disaggregation 
of middlemen and the consideration of various suc-
cessive and bilateral monopoly/oligopoly relation-
ships between food manufacturers and retailers, as 
well as their impact on the causes and consequences 
of food adulteration and mislabeling. 
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